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Abstract
This article presents the results of a systematic review of international studies on economic and
quality effects of contracting out published in the period from 2000 to 2014 . We conducted
a comprehensive search of the literature and identiﬁed 49 relevant studies. There are three main
ﬁndings of the systematic review: (1) cost savings documented in international contracting out liter-
ature have been decreasing over time; (2) cost savings have been much greater in technical services
than in social services; and (3) economic effects have been twice as large in Anglo-Saxon countries
compared with other countries. With regard to measuring the effect of contracting out on service
quality, which is a vital component of any service delivery arrangement, very few studies assess this
issue in a comprehensive manner. There is also a signiﬁcant lack of studies that include measures of
transaction costs, thereby making it difﬁcult to evaluate the impact of contracting out on overall cost-
effectiveness of public service delivery. We conclude that generalization of effects from contracting out
should be made with caution and are likely to depend, among other things, on the transaction costs
characteristics of the service, the market situation and the institutional/regulatory setting.
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Introduction
Private delivery of government-funded services by means of contracting out
constitutes an increasingly utilized alternative to public provision of technical
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and social services in developed countries (Ohlsson 2003; Stolt et al. 2011;
Rostgaard and Szebehely 2012 ). A number of studies have highlighted pri-
vate production as more cost-effective than public production (Blom-Hansen
2003; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007; Gilmer 2010 ), though recent analyses
have contested the magnitude of previously documented cost savings from
contracting out (cf. Bel et al. 2010 ; Hartman 2011 ; Petersen and Hjelmar
2013). The widespread belief in the private market as superior to public
service provision was reinforced by a number of much-cited reviews and
meta-analyses of empirical studies published throughout the 1960s–90s.
The ﬁndings emerging from these meta-reviews were that the cost saving
potential of contracting out was often in the range of 15–20 per cent
(Borcherding et al. 1982), and in the most optimistic accounts even up to as
much as 30 per cent (Savas 1987; Domberger and Jensen 1997).
However, other and more recent assessments of the international empir-
ical evidence have found smaller and more mixed effects of contracting out
(Bel et al. 2010; Hartman 2011). In a comprehensive meta-analysis of inter-
national studies, Hodge (2000 ) found average cost savings in the range of
6–12 per cent after correcting for transaction costs. Moreover, cost savings
were both larger and better documented in technical services (e.g. garbage
collection and ground maintenance) than in social services, such as health
and policing. Based on these results, Hodge noted that ‘expecting
contracting to be a panacea for all public services, though, would be foolish’
(Hodge 2000: 246–7). In another seminal study, Boyne (1998) examined
almost 40 empirical analyses from the UK and the USA, and found cost
savings documented in the majority of studies. At the same time, however,
Boyne (1998) criticized the existing literature for using inadequate method-
ology, lacking sufﬁcient data and for paying too little attention to service
quality, thus making it difﬁcult to evaluate the impact of contracting out
on overall cost-effectiveness of service delivery. Whereas contracting out
has remained high on government agendas and the volume and scope of
privately delivered services has been gradually extended, there has not been
a corresponding development in systematic assessments of international
experience since the turn of the millennium (see, however, Bel et al. 2010;
Vrangbæk et al. 2015).
This article presents the results of a systematic review of international stud-
ies on economic and quality effects of contracting out published in the period
2000–14. The review is based on 49 studies, and systematically assesses the
collected empirical evidence on economic and quality effects in international
peer-reviewed journals since the last systematic review that was published at
the turn of the millennium (Hodge 2000 ). The examination in this article
is based on the following research question: ‘Does the evidence presented in
internationally published articles in the 15-year period 2000–14 show that
contracting out has resulted in cost savings?’. In addition to this general
research question, we examine documented effects for service quality,
differences between technical and social services, differences in effects across
different national institutional contexts (in particular Anglo-Saxon countries
versus other countries), and longitudinal developments in documented effects
over the examined time period.
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Carrying out an updated review of the international literature on
contracting out is timely and warranted for several reasons.
First, whereas the assessed literature in previous reviews was published in
the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, a number of recent studies have
pointed to more mixed effects of contracting out (Bel et al. 2010; Petersen
and Hjelmar 2013 ), and even to a tendency towards declining effects in some
service areas (Bel and Costas 2006; Hutchinson and Pratt 2007 ; Houlberg
and Petersen 2015 ). A reason could be that contractual relationships have
moved from ﬁrst generation to second, third or fourth generation, and public
organizations have now been exposed to competition for several decades
(Bekken et al. 2006 ; Bae 2010). An updated review of recent experiences
could thus provide other and more nuanced results than assessments of the
early experience.
Second, while previous reviews mainly covered experiences from the USA
and the UK, there is today a much broader literature covering more countries
and geographical areas with different institutional and regulatory settings
(Brennan et al. 2012). We can thus examine whether the early lessons from
Anglo-Saxon countries also hold true for other countries with different regu-
latory, ideological and institutional contexts.
Third, whereas the majority of previous research has examined experiences
with a focus on technical service areas, the scope of contracting out has
gradually expanded and nowadays also includes welfare services, which are
more labour intensive (Hartman 2011 ; Szebehely and Trydegård 2012 )
and tend to have higher transaction costs (Brown and Potoski 2003 ; Hefetz
and Warner 2012). Welfare services were only marginally represented in
previous reviews, and we can therefore extend previous insights by
systematically scrutinizing the evidence on contracting out across technical
services and welfare services.
To summarize, the aim of the article is to establish an updated assessment of
documented effects of contracting out that covers developments since the turn
of the millennium and covers a broader range of countries and service areas
than previous systematic reviews of the literature. The article is organized as
follows. The next section discusses different approaches to assessing and
evaluating effects of contracting out based on previous studies and recent
theoretical discussions. We then outline how the systematic collection and
assessment of studies was carried out. This is followed by a presentation of the
results of the systematic review. We then discuss the lessons learned and provide
some reﬂections pertaining to comparison of public and private service delivery.
Lastly, we conclude on the ﬁndings and consider future avenues of research.
Theoretical Background: Effects of Contracting Out
Theoretical arguments regarding effects of contracting out in the public sector
have been contested for decades (Vining and Boardman 1992; Bel and
Warner 2008). Theoretical claims of positive effects typically stem from public
choice and property rights theory, which revolves around a competition and an
ownership argument, respectively (Domberger and Jensen 1997;
Blom-Hansen 2003; Alonso et al. 2015 ).
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The competition argument states that private sector producers are forced by
competitive pressure to optimize efﬁciency, while public organizations oper-
ate in a monopoly situation with the same risk of inefﬁciencies as private
monopolies. The lack of competitive pressure means that public managers
are unable to measure the efﬁciency of their organizations against other sim-
ilar organizations. Decisions on resource allocation and survival of the organi-
zation are therefore left to public decision makers who are unable to rely on
information about demand and efﬁcient supply that markets can provide.
The ownership argument states that public sector agencies lack incentives to
perform efﬁciently; they often have broad and ill-deﬁned public service objec-
tives, and they have no bankruptcy constraint. Therefore, public organiza-
tions can continue to perform at sub-optimal levels without the risk of going
out of business, which is a threat that private companies are faced with
(Alonso et al. 2015). Furthermore, public organizations are not accountable
to shareholders and owners, which in turn is a characteristic of private com-
panies that makes them focus on innovation and technological development
in order to stay competitive (Bennmarker et al. 2013).
Several theoretical attempts to nuance and broaden the expectations from
public choice and property rights theory have been provided in the literature
(Bel and Warner 2008; Vrangbæk et al. 2015 ). The ﬁrst stems from transac-
tion costs economics, which underlines the importance of asset speciﬁcity and
measurability of the service that is to be contracted out (Williamson 1979;
Brown and Potoski 2003). Rather than approaching public services as some-
thing that would by deﬁnition be more effectively produced in a private
market, transaction cost economics hypothesizes that different service charac-
teristics create more or less favourable conditions for in-house production and
contracting out (Hefetz and Warner 2012 ). Economic beneﬁts from private
contracting are thus more likely to be realized if the quantity and quality of
the service can be unambiguously described and measured; otherwise, the
administrative costs of preparing tenders, evaluating bids, signing the contract
and monitoring (and possibly sanctioning) service delivery are likely to be
high. The largest economic effects are thus expected in technical services
characterized by low asset speciﬁcity and high measurability, whereas smaller
or even negative economic effects could be expected in complex services with
high asset speciﬁcity and low (or highly expensive) measurability. By this
token, transaction cost economics adds a more task speciﬁc theoretical
perspective on contracting out which nuances the somewhat generalized view
stemming from the competition and ownership argument.
Another major theoretical approach that extends public choice and prop-
erty rights theory is industrial organization literature, which stresses a number of
factors that make public markets distinct from traditional private markets
and thus create less optimal conditions for contracting out than expected by
public choice theory (Bel and Warner 2008). According to the industrial
organizational perspective, many public services are characterized by natural
monopolies and high entrance costs, which limit competition and make public
markets function in a less perfect way than private markets (Gilmour and
Jensen 1998). Quasi-market theory also stresses that public services are often
subject to signiﬁcant information deﬁciencies and asymmetries (Bartlett and
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Le Grand 1993 ). This is particularly a problem in welfare services, such as
nursing homes or childcare, where those buying the service (i.e. the public
sector) have limited oversight of those delivering the services (i.e. the private
company). The presence of information asymmetries can lead to goal avoid-
ance and unwanted practices, such as cream-skimming (selection of the easiest
tasks) and parking of the least proﬁtable citizens/customers. Principal-agent
problems can thus make quality measurement difﬁcult and possibly erode cost
savings or quality improvements that were foreseen by theories based on
assumptions of more or less perfect market conditions.
Lastly, an argument about decreasing marginal effects from contracting
out, which suggests that economic effects tend to decrease over time, has
been proposed in the literature (Bekken et al. 2006; Hutchinson and Pratt
2007; Houlberg and Petersen 2015 ). There are two theoretical claims
behind this argument. First, it is likely that rational public organizations
will begin the contracting out of the services and tasks for which the largest
gains are expected. Hence, once they have ‘harvested the low hanging
fruits’ public organizations could face decreasing marginal beneﬁts from
additional contracting out (Bel and Costas 2006; Houlberg and Petersen
2015). Second, involvement of private providers creates a competitive pres-
sure on public in-house production units, which may lead to more effective
public production (Bae 2010). In contrast to property rights theory, the
assertion is that public organizations can, in fact, cease to exist if their
services are contracted out. The market mechanism and exposure to
competition, according to this argument, not only increases the efﬁciency
of the external (contracted out) services, but also of the internally produced
services (Bel and Costas 2006). Moreover, quasi-markets characterized by
high entrance costs and/or natural monopolies may be dominated by
monopolies or oligopolies, which impede competition and create less ideal
conditions for contracting out than envisioned by public choice and prop-
erty rights theory.
This brief introduction to key theoretical arguments in the literature leads
us to formulate several themes for the systematic review. First, we analyze
whether studies from the period 2000–14 support the ﬁndings from earlier
research regarding cost savings from contracting out. Second, we examine
whether the studies include assessments of service quality, as this is a key
parameter in evaluating the effects of contracting out on overall cost-
effectiveness. Third, we investigate whether documented effects are different
in technical services with low transaction costs compared to social services
characterized by high transaction costs. Fourth, we examine the issue of reg-
ulatory and institutional context by comparing the evidence from studies in
Anglo-Saxon countries with evidence from more coordinated (and regulated)
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), which according to the ‘varieties
of unionism’ literature also display different traditions for labour union power
and involvement (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013). Union power
can be assessed according to membership density and bargaining coverage
rates. Anglo-saxon countries, such as England and Ireland, have much lower
bargaining coverage than social democratic/egalitarian countries (Denmark
and Sweden), social partnership countries (Germany, the Netherlands,
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Austria) and countries with strong socialist/communist inﬂuence on labour
unions (France, Italy) (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013).
Lastly, inspired by Bel and Costas (2006 ) and Dijkgraaf and Gradus
(2013), among others, we adopt a longitudinal perspective and examine
how the documented effects of contracting out have developed over the
15 years since the turn of the millennium.
Systematic Review Method
The aim of any systematic review is to collect, assess and synthesize the
available knowledge produced within a speciﬁc ﬁeld of literature. Here, the
literature ﬁeld here is conﬁned to studies of contracting out, which investigate
effects relating to costs and service quality and were published in the period
2000–14.
Prior to carrying out the systematic review, a number of deﬁnitions and
decisions need to be clariﬁed. Contracting out is here deﬁned as the private
provision of publicly funded services, whereby the public sector takes on the
role of buyer, but retains the overall responsibility for ﬁnancing the service
(Petersen and Hjelmar 2013). In line with Hodge (2000) and Jensen and
Stonecash (2005), we distinguish between privatization as sale of public assets
(not our focus) and contracting out deﬁned as a temporary transfer of
production responsibility to a private company (for-proﬁt or non-proﬁt) in
return for economic compensation. The latter process commonly takes place
by means of competitive tendering, which enables the public sector to choose
among various private bidders. Experiences with other types of marketization,
such as public-private partnerships, free-choice markets, voucher-based
systems and privatization, were not our focus here, and such studies were omit-
ted from the assessment (see more details on inclusion and exclusion criteria
below).
The systematic review is based on a methodological approach inspired by
the British EPPI-Centre’s methodology (Gough 2004). This approach is
somewhat broader in scope than review methodologies used by Cochrane
and Campbell, which emphasize randomized controlled trials (RCT) as the
golden standard for evaluation (Konnerup and Kongsted 2012 ). In contrast
to medicine and psychology, which make extensive use of RCT in empirical
studies, experimental research designs are very rare in the ﬁeld of contracting
out. Using RCT as the norm would thus exclude most analyses with relevance
to our research question. The EPPI-Centre’s approach, in contrast, empha-
sizes a broader range of methodological designs, and includes both quantita-
tive and qualitative studies (Gough 2004 ). Using this approach enabled us to
collect and assess the collected empirical literature on the effects of
contracting regardless of the type of data and qualitative/quantitative method
applied. The search for studies for the systematic review consisted of three
stepwise phases, as illustrated in ﬁgure 1 .
In the ﬁrst phase, we conducted a systematic search of literature in a broad
range of relevant databases, which were not conﬁned to a speciﬁc research
ﬁeld. Nor was it conﬁned to studies in Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI)
journals, but included all articles in peer-reviewed journals, thus leaving out
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books and book chapters as well as papers published in non-English journals.
The following databases were used in the screening of relevant studies: Web of
Science (SSCI), Econlit, Sociological Abstracts, Social Services Abstracts,
ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), PILOT Database,
Campbell Library and Cochrane Library. Our searches were based on the
most central terms in relation to our research question: contracting,
contracting out, outsourcing, tender, competitive tender, competitive bidding,
marketisation/marketization and public. Moreover, in order to include
studies that use the term ‘ownership’ (which is for example the case in some
health care analyses), but actually examine experiences with contracting out
as deﬁned above, we carried out additional searches in Web of Science (SSCI)
and Econlit on ownership, contracting, outsourcing or bid in combination
with public and private and cost, saving, quality or efﬁciency. In total, the
searches resulted in 7 ,217 studies published in the period 2000–14 .
In the second phase, we examined the individual publications on the basis
of their title and abstracts, and made an assessment of whether the publica-
tions addressed the research question and met the predeﬁned list of inclusion
criteria and were not subject to exclusion criteria. The speciﬁc inclusion
criteria were: contracting out (sometimes also formulated as outsourcing) in
the public sector in advanced industrialized countries (Europe, North
America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, etc.), focus on effects
for cost and/or service quality, and publication year from 2000 until 2014 .
The costs measured in the studies are those incurred by governments and
which are directly related to production of the service, whereas possible costs
to other parties, such as users or workers, are typically not included in the
studies (for an overview of employee costs, see Vrangbæk et al. 2015).
Figure 1
Overview of the systematic review procedure. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
SOCIAL POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, VOL.52, NO. 1, JANUARY 2018
© 2017 John Wiley & Sons Ltd136
Exclusion criteria were: studies from other countries than those stipulated by
the inclusion criteria and studies focusing on other forms of public/private
interaction than contracting out. Further exclusion criteria were studies with
a strictly theoretical focus, studies of legal and regulatory frameworks, analyses
of determinants/causes of contracting out and studies focusing on the process
of contracting out rather than the effects. Lastly, we have included only
primary empirical studies in the review, and not literature reviews and meta-
analyses because they do not contain primary empirical data.
In the third phase, we assessed in detail the selected publications in order to
determine whether the publications were relevant and whether the publica-
tions were of a satisfactory quality. A quality assessment scheme with13 over-
all assessment criteria was developed and applied to all studies that were
relevant according to our research questions and inclusion/exclusion criteria.
The overall quality criteria used to assess each study were: (1 ) whether the
study is based on an appropriate analytical design compared to the object
of the analysis and the availability of relevant data in the ﬁeld; (2) whether
the data collection meets relevant standards. In quantitative studies the data
collection should support statistical generalization and in qualitative research
the collected data should be sufﬁcient to support in-depth interpretations; and
(3 ) whether the conclusions of the analysis are based on suitable methods for
calculating the effects of contracting out and whether reporting of the ﬁndings
provide relevant considerations regarding generalizability and interpretation
of the ﬁndings.
On the basis of an assessment of the full-length articles we could determine
which articles were relevant for our study and which articles could be
excluded due to lack of relevance. The quality assessment led us to discard
a number of studies due to insufﬁcient design, methodology, data and/or
problems with the technical execution of the analysis. The ﬁnal set of studies
consists of 49 publications that deal with the effects of contracting out in
terms of costs and/or service quality in the period 2000–14. In comparison,
Hodge’s widely cited meta-analysis was based on 28 publications (Hodge
2000 ) and Boyne’s (1998) on around 40 studies.
Although our ﬁnal list of studies is based on systematic searches in a
comprehensive list of databases and include all relevant and methodologically
satisfactory publications that came up during our searches, it should be
acknowledged that additional relevant studies could potentially have been
missed due to the use of alternative wording and/or publication channels than
those covered by this review. Moreover, publication bias could also be an
issue, as found in the meta-regression analysis by Bel et al. (2010). The
qualitative review method we use does not make it possible to carry out a
formal test of publication bias, although the fact that a rather high proportion
of the 49 studies found no signiﬁcant cost difference makes us less concerned
about this potential problem.
Results of the Systematic Review
Table 1 provides an overview of key information for the 49 studies in the
systematic review.
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Focusing ﬁrst on the documented effects of contracting out on costs,
table 1 shows a relatively large diversity across studies that measure cost
effects. There are all in all 37 studies documenting either cost reductions,
cost increases or no signiﬁcant differences between public (in-house) produc-
tion and contracting out. Moreover, four additional studies consider eco-
nomic effects, but do not provide an estimate of the effect size and
therefore cannot be included in our analysis of average effects below. The
magnitude of the reported cost effects varies from a cost reduction of 45
per cent to a cost increase of 18.3 per cent, which documents a very broad
span in the economic effects of contracting out in studies published from
2000 to 2014. Of the 37 studies that provide estimates of cost effects,
17 studies document cost savings, while nine studies document cost increases
and 11 studies ﬁnd no signiﬁcant cost changes. The average cost effect from
contracting reported in studies published in the period 2000–14 is a cost
reduction of 4.2 per cent.
Another ﬁnding relating to the cost of producing public services is the
absence of studies that measure transaction costs and take these costs into
account. Of the 49 studies there is only one study that includes transaction
costs for private production, but not for public production, and the actual size
of transaction costs is not measured (McDavid 2001). There are also three
studies asserting that transaction costs are likely to be higher when services
are contracted out than with public production, but none of them measures
the size of these costs (Keane et al. 2001; Ohlsson 2003 ; Rho 2013). The
general lack of measurement of transaction costs in the vast majority of studies
clearly makes a comparison of the full costs of public and contracted out service
provision difﬁcult. The average cost saving of 4 .2 per cent is essentially a
comparison of direct production costs, whereas in the majority of research
other relevant (but indirect) costs relating to tendering, bids evaluation,
contract signature, monitoring and sanctioning of contracts are not included
in the cost estimate.
Moreover, any assessment of the economic effects of contracting out
should, ideally, also take into consideration outcomes relating to service
quality. Altogether, 19 studies out of 49 consider service quality as a
dependent variable, though most of them do not provide quantitative
measures of the effect, but merely evaluate that quality has either
improved, decreased or has not been affected. Of the 19 studies, six report
positive effects on quality as a result of contracting out, though only two
studies quantify the quality improvement (Marques 2008; Rho 2013).
There are four studies which document negative effects on service quality
as a result of contracting out, whereas nine studies ﬁnd mixed quality
effects or reach no clear conclusion. Lastly, six studies include service
quality as a control variable (some with more data than others), while 24
studies do not consider service quality at all. Hence, approximately half
of the 49 studies do not examine effects relating to service quality at all,
and the details given in table 1 show that merely a handful of studies
measure service quality in a comprehensive and encompassing manner
(Marques 2008 ; Stolt et al. 2011; Pérotin et al. 2013 ; Stanley et al. 2013;
Laun and Thoursie 2014).
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The secondary research themes of the systematic review were: (1) develop-
ments in cost effects over time; (2 ) possible differences in effects across techni-
cal and social services; and (3) geographical variations and institutional
context. These results are reported in table 2 . The table provides noteworthy
insights that extend previous knowledge on the internationally documented
effects of contracting out. Looking ﬁrst at longitudinal developments, table 2
shows a declining trend in the documented cost difference between public
and private production over time. In studies from the period 2000–04 cost
savings are 8.5 per cent on average, while cost savings dropped to 4.8 per
cent from the period 2005–09 and further decreased to 0.4 per cent from
the period 2010–14. Cost savings from contracting out have thus been
signiﬁcantly declining over the 15-year period and are only marginally
different from zero in the last ﬁve-year period. The decrease in effects over
time might be due to either increased efﬁciency of public provision or
decreased efﬁciency of private provision, or a combination of the two. Which
explanation actually applies is not addressed in most of the studies included in
the review (see, however, Bel and Costas 2006 ), which means that we cannot
draw any ﬁnal conclusions regarding the speciﬁc reasons behind the declining
effects from contracting out since the turn of the millennium.
Furthermore, the results for various types of services show that cost savings
from the contracting out of technical services have on average been 5.7 per
cent over the period. This compares to average cost savings of 0.2 per cent
in social services, which for all practical purposes (and given the relatively
small n) is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. The varying cost effects in
technical and social services are well in line with our theoretical expectations
based on transaction cost theory and the difference in asset speciﬁcity and
measurability, which made us expect smaller and more diverse cost effects
in social services than in technical services. The differences in cost effects
between social and technical services are noteworthy because they indicate
that savings from contracting out previously found in systematic reviews of
Table 2
Cost difference between public and private production (negative values = cost savings)
Number of studies (N = 37 )
Cost difference public versus private
production (per cent)
Year 2000–2004 11 -8.5
Year 2005–2009 12 -4.8
Year 2010–2014 14 -0.4
Social services 11 -0.2
Technical services 27 -5.7
Anglo-Saxon countries 14 -6.4
Other countries 23 -2.9
Source: 37 studies on economic effects of contracting out, 2000–14.
Note: Studies of social and technical services sum to 38 and not 37 because one study covers both services.
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studies in technical services cannot simply be generalized to social services.
These insights add to previous literature by showing that the documented
effects of contracting out depend highly on the transaction cost characteristics
of the service.
Lastly, in relation to the geographical variable, the last two rows of
table 2 show that cost savings from contracting out have been on average
6 .4 per cent in Anglo-Saxon countries and 2.9 per cent in other countries.
Interestingly, documented cost effects from contracting out between 2000
and 2014 are more than twice as large in Anglo-Saxon countries as in
other countries. These ﬁndings support our theoretical expectations about
larger effects from contracting out in liberal market economies with less reg-
ulated labour markets and weaker unions compared with more regulated
market economies (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013). The ﬁndings
from our systematic review of studies from the period 2000–14 thus indi-
cate that previous meta-analyses from the 1980s and 1990s, which mainly
included technical services and Anglo-Saxon countries, might have found
larger cost savings than would have been the case if the experiences from
a broader range of countries and social services were to a larger extent
included in the assessment of the evidence. These insights underpin that
generalization of economic effects across geographic regions should be made
with caution in the same way as generalization across service areas with
different transaction cost characteristics.
Discussion
The review of international studies on the effects of contracting out
illustrates that the studies are of variable quality, as also noted almost
20 years ago in the review by Boyne (1998). There is (with some notable
exceptions) a distinct lack of studies with a solid methodological foundation
documenting effects of contracting out in relation to costs, quality and
transaction costs. Most studies focus on cost effects, while many entirely
leave out or only scarcely examine service quality outcomes. As a conse-
quence, there are very few studies that enable a comprehensive assessment
of the effect of contracting out on overall effectiveness of service delivery.
Some studies simply assume that quality remains unchanged
(e.g. Christoffersen et al. 2007 ), while many others fail to consider service
quality altogether. These weaknesses and limitations are problematic because
they can lead to simpliﬁed or even erroneous interpretations of the overall
effects of contracting out.
In the following, we discuss a selection of the themes that have become
apparent in our review, and how these issues may have inﬂuenced the results
that were reported in the studies.
The challenge of comparability
There is a fundamental challenge when comparing effects of public and private
organizations. Ideally, assessments of the effects should compare private and
public suppliers that provide exactly the same services under similar
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organizational and regulatory conditions. This situation is rarely present in
practice, as industrial organization theory has underlined. There may be
differences in the scope of services, the regulatory settings and other task spe-
ciﬁc elements that frame the trade-off between in-house provision and
contracting out (Levin and Tadelis 2010 ). Basically, we demand that our pub-
lic organizations deliver a broader range of services than their private counter-
parts. Also, public organizations are often required to serve all citizens in a
given area, while private companies can often choose their markets and
services.
Moreover, if it is not ownership (property rights theory), but rather the
competitive environment (public choice theory) that determines the outcome
of contracting out, it also becomes important to measure competition in pub-
lic service markets. Most studies measuring competition ﬁnd that competition
for public services is limited (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007 ; Levin and Tadelis
2010; Hefetz and Warner 2012), although the more precise link between
market characteristics, institutional settings and outcomes of contracting out
still needs further scrutiny (Brown and Potoski 2003). These and related dif-
ferences in the production context of public and private organizations poten-
tially create problems of comparability, which scholars of public service
delivery need to take into account when evaluating the costs and quality of
public and private service provision.
The challenge of short time spans
The importance of viewing effects of contracting out as a dynamic
phenomenon developing over time has been stressed in recent research
(Bel and Costas 2006 ; Hutchinson and Pratt 2007; Bae 2010 ) and has been
highlighted by our ﬁndings as well. However, most empirical studies identiﬁed
in our review limit themselves to look at a short time period and consider ﬁrst
generation contracting only. The short time perspective is problematic because
the ﬁrst contract period can be considered a learning period for both the public
and the private party. In this learning period transaction costs are likely to be
higher than in subsequent tenders. It is also problematic because during the
ﬁrst tender the private party may be tempted or pressured to set a low price
to enter the market and typically feel compelled to raise the price in the next
contract round (Bel and Costas 2006).
A basic problem that is seldom accounted for in current studies is the
need to carry out a fair comparison between public and private organiza-
tions at the same point in time. In many qualitative studies of contracting
out it is common to compare the performance of public organizations at
an earlier point in time than the performance of private organizations.
However, in a pre-post study it is methodologically problematic to make
an uncontrolled comparison between public and private organizations
without taking into account the development over time which may have been
taking place after the contracting out. It is thus crucial to avoid using the wrong
public sector benchmark as the basis for a comparison with private provision
because such effects can also be dynamic and change over time (Bel and Costas
2006; Houlberg and Petersen 2015).
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Inclusion of all direct and indirect costs
Only few studies in the review provide an examination of transaction costs
related to tendering, contracting and subsequent monitoring of service
delivery. Yet, when measuring the economic effects of contracting out, it is
vital to include transaction costs. Such costs should, ideally, be compared to
the administrative costs related to producing services in-house by the public
sector. However, among the 49 studies we have not identiﬁed any study
making such a comparison.
There are also other possible indirect costs that should be considered. This
applies to the costs related to maintaining a preparedness to take over in case
of private sector bankruptcy and/or non-compliance with a contract. Further-
more, as highlighted by Bel and Mur (2009), it is important to take into
account different contextual and market conditions in urban and rural
settings. A well-functioning private market requires several providers that
compete for contracts. That is not always the case in sparsely populated rural
areas. Effects of contracting out obtained in urban areas do not necessarily
apply in rural areas where infrastructure, population density and potential
for recruitment are very different, and the cost structure for both public and
private actors vary signiﬁcantly compared to an urban context.
Measuring service quality: a challenging yet important task
Most scholars agree that service quality constitutes an integral part of service
delivery, yet few studies accomplish to measure it. Service quality, moreover,
is an ambiguous and methodologically difﬁcult concept to measure in public
and private services alike. Quality can refer to different things and include
user perceptions as well as more objective and standardized measures. A com-
monly used terminology distinguishes between input, process and outcome
dimensions of quality (Stolt et al. 2011). Input is typically measured in terms
of resources (e.g. human and technical resources). Process refers to the proce-
dures and to the direct output (e.g. frequency of snow-ploughing, cutting the
grass, collection of garbage and so on). Lastly, outcome is the most important
measure of quality as it relates to the actual impact (e.g. long-term health after
hospitalization or student performance in schools). In technical areas it is
relatively easy to specify process and output measures and argue that they
are valid indicators of quality. Repairing pot-holes and providing frequent
snow-ploughing probably have a fairly straightforward causal link to number
of road accidents, which could be a solid outcome indicator.
When it comes to more complex welfare services, however, it is not that
simple. One can count the number of hours provided in day care or the
frequency of visits to elderly persons, but this does not necessarily provide
information about the effects on the social and intellectual skills conveyed to
children in day care or the health and quality of life for the elderly. In
addition, there are often conﬂicting views on what the primary outcome
should be. Preschool day care can, for instance, be judged in terms of
intellectual progress, quality of life, social skills or parent satisfaction. Such
conceptual and methodological challenges of measuring quality can perhaps
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explain why this dimension is rarely included, but it can hardly justify this
practice. Obviously, more thorough studies about changes in quality resulting
from contracting out are needed, before general conclusions about effects of
contracting out for service quality can be drawn (see also Boyne 1998).
Concluding Remarks
The systematic review of international studies in the period 2000–14 shows
that there is empirical evidence of cost savings from contracting out in techni-
cal areas, but not in social services. It is important to stress, however, that the
evidence in social services is much scarcer and more difﬁcult to uncover than
in technical services. There is a remarkable lack of studies thoroughly exam-
ining effects of contracting out for service quality, and the ﬁndings in the
few studies that do examine service quality are mixed. Furthermore, hardly
any studies include empirical estimates of transaction costs. Transaction cost
theory teaches us that the full cost of producing any good or service consists
of the sum of production costs and transaction costs (Williamson1979; Brown
and Potoski 2003; Hefetz and Warner 2012). Excluding the latter from the
cost-estimation is therefore an important limitation of the current literature
on effects of contracting out.
Most of the 49 studies are carried out as static investigations with limited
consideration of the dynamic and longer-term effects, for instance by repeated
contracting out (for exceptions, see Bel and Costas 2006; Dijkgraaf and
Gradus 2013 ). In these instances, private companies typically hold the
contract as a result of an earlier tender and other private companies are the
main competitors. This is, obviously, a very different scenario compared to
ﬁrst generation tenders. The few studies that do include a longer-term
perspective indicate that marginal beneﬁts of contracting out tend to be
decreasing over time (Bel and Costas 2006; Hutchinson and Pratt 2007 ;
Houlberg and Petersen 2015), which was also a main result of our assessment
of economic effects in studies from the periods 2000–04 , 2005–09 and
2010–14, respectively.
Overall, the assessment of the contracting out literature from the period
2000–14 illustrates that cost savings (average 4.2 per cent) have been
documented, though mainly in technical services, in Anglo-Saxon countries,
and in the beginning of the examined time period. Results from existing
studies are fairly heterogeneous (from cost savings of 45 per cent to cost
increases of 18 per cent) and generalization of ﬁndings across service areas,
between countries with differing regulatory and institutional settings, and
across time should thus be made with caution. Cost savings are rather
limited, they seem to become smaller over time, and other important
aspects, such as service quality and transaction costs, are scarcely measured.
The lack of solid documentation of service quality and transactions costs
highlights the need for a balanced and pragmatic view on the respective
pros and cons of contracting out.
The results from the systematic review are generally in line with previous
review studies; hence, like Boyne (1998), Hodge (2000) and Bel et al.
(2010), we conclude the article by emphasizing the methodological limitation
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of most existing studies, particularly with regard to examining outcomes for
service quality. Admittedly, there are some studies that scrutinize contracting
out and service quality in sufﬁcient detail (cf. Stolt et al. 2011; Pérotin et al.
2013; Laun and Thoursie 2014), but most analyses examine this important
element superﬁcially or not at all. It is unlikely that anybody visiting the local
grocery store would purchase a bottle of milk or a packet of meat without
being concerned with the relation between price and quality. However, when
contracting out services to the private market the public sector often lacks this
fundamental information. Unfortunately, contemporary academic literature
provides limited guidance to public policymakers on this important topic,
since hardly any studies evaluate contracting out with regard to the impact
on overall cost-effectiveness.
For future research, a more context-oriented approach, which measures
both direct production costs, transaction costs and service quality, is timely
and warranted. Other dimensions including effects on users and employees
also constitute important avenues for further research. Based on current
knowledge from international research, we conclude that contracting out
has not been the great panacea, though, in speciﬁc cases and settings,
contracting out has proven to be an effective tool for the public sector.
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